The Upper Register

Merit and Moses: All Posts Combined

I have combined my series of posts responding to the book Merit and Moses into a single document. It comes to 43 pages, single spaced. I also added this Conclusion at the end:

The authors of Merit and Moses seriously misrepresent Kline when they claim he defined merit in voluntaristic terms, as whatever God says it is, untethered to his nature as a God of perfect justice. Taking their misrepresentation of Kline’s definition of merit as their unquestioned starting point, the authors proceed to level wild and irresponsible accusations. The most egregious accusation is their claim that Kline redefined merit with regard to Adam and Christ, specifically so that he could open up the possibility of sinners (e.g., Israel, patriarchs) meriting blessings from God. But Kline never made that move. He spoke of post-Fall “merit” only as obedience invested by God with typological significance, not as true merit. Oddly, at the beginning of the book, the authors pay lip service to the architectonic role typology plays in Kline’s thought. But in the course of their argument, they ignore Kline’s typological two-layer construct and interpret him within their own ordo salutis categories. The attack missiles launched by Merit and Moses miss their target by a wide margin.

Merit and Moses: Flawed Typology? Part 2

In contrast with the authors of MM—who deny that the imperfect obedience of OT saints can typify the perfect obedience of Christ (MM 130)—many Reformed commentators taught this very thing. I am no expert on 17th century Reformed literature, but I was able to find the following quotes just by searching Google Books.

In his dissertation, Why Heaven Kissed Earth: The Christology of the Puritan Reformed Orthodox Theologian, Thomas Goodwin (1600–1680)  [RHT 13; V&R, 2010], Mark Jones explains that

Goodwin argues that the eminent Old Testament saints were types of Jesus Christ .... Adam, Noah, Melchizedek, Joseph, Moses, Samson, David, and Solomon, for example, were all types of Jesus Christ (p. 93).

But how could sinful OT saints be types of Christ? In his treatise, Of Christ the Mediator, Goodwin explains:

The general rule which the apostles went by, and which the Jews themselves assented unto, and their teachers taught them, was, that whatever eminent and extraordinary excellency was found in any of their ancestors renowned in the Old Testament, or in the ceremonial law, that all such foresignified the Messiah to come, as the perfection and centre of them (Works of Goodwin, ed. Nichol, vol. 5, p. 150).

Or consider Thomas Taylor (1576–1633), an English Puritan who remained within the Church of England. He wrote a treatise titled, Christ Revealed, or The Old Testament explained: A treatise of the types and shadowes of our Saviour contained throughout the whole Scripture (1635). Taylor subdivides the types of Christ into holy persons and holy things. Under holy persons, he includes the following as types of Christ: Adam, Noah, Melchizedek, Isaac, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, Samson, Solomon, Jonah, and others.

I have not read the whole treatise, but I looked at his treatment of Noah. Taylor suggests that Noah was a type of Christ in seven ways. Relevant to our discussion here is the second way that Noah was a type of Christ. Quoting Gen 6:9 (“Noah was a just man and perfect in his generations, and Noah walked with God” [KJV]), Taylor sees this similarity between Noah and Christ: “Both are said to be just and perfect; both said to walke with God.” However, there are differences between Noah’s righteousness and Christ’s, including the fact that “Noah was perfect but in part: Christ perfectly perfect” (pp. 10-11; Early English Books Online, via PRDL).

Samuel Mather (1626–1671) was a Puritan of the Independent variety. He was the older brother of Increase Mather (the father of Cotton Mather). For a time he served as chaplain of Magdalen College, Oxford, under the presidency of Thomas Goodwin. In a treatise titled, The Gospel of the Old Testament: an explanation of the types and figures by which Christ was exhibited under the legal dispensation, he wrote: 

Inasmuch as the holiest had their sins, we have further to observe, that they [OT saints] were not types of Christ in regard to their sinful failings, but only in their graces and excellences (p. 82 in the 1834 edition).

John Brown (1784–1858), grandson of John Brown of Haddington (1722–1787), was a minister and professor of exegetical theology in the Scottish Secession church. He wrote a book titled, The Sufferings and Glories of the Messiah (1853), which contained a detailed exegesis of Psalm 18 and Isaiah 53. He argued that Psalm 18 ought to be interpreted as a Messianic Psalm right along with Psalms 2, 16, 22, 40, and 110. He believed that in Psalm 18 “a greater than David is here—that, so far as the subject of the psalm is concerned, David is not here at all, except, it may be, in the way of allusive illustration” (p. 25). When he came to verses 20-24, he interpreted them as referring typologically to the merit of Christ:

In the fourth section of this Messianic psalm ... we find the beloved Servant of Jehovah, delivered from all his enemies and the power of the grave, representing, in his solemn thanksgiving, his deliverance and exaltation as the expression of Jehovah’s entire satisfaction with his conduct, and as the merited reward of his having become obedient—obedient even to the death .... “The Lord rewarded me according to my righteousness; according to the cleanness of my hands hath he recompensed me ...” [Ps 18:20ff]. The words before us are an acknowledgment, on the part of the delivered and rewarded Messiah, of the righteousness of Jehovah in his deliverance and reward. The general idea is,—These wonderful works of Jehovah, which have just been commemorated, are the merited expression of his entire righteous approbation of, and most complacent holy delight in, his humbled and suffering Servant’s person and work (pp. 97-98, emphasis added).

John Brown has a footnote in which he quotes George Horne (1730–1792). Horne was a bishop in the Church of England who wrote A Commentary on the Book of Psalms (1771) that was widely influential in its time and in the subsequent century. Commenting on Psalm 18:20-24, Horne wrote:

Commentators have been much perplexed to account for these unlimited claims to righteousness made by David .... But if the Psalm be prophetical, and sung by the victorious monarch in the person of king Messiah, then do the verses now before us no less exactly than beautifully delineate that all-perfect righteousness wrought by the Redeemer, in consequence of which, he obtained deliverance for himself and his people. For “his” righteousness’ sake Jehovah was well pleased, and rewarded with everlasting felicity the unspotted purity of his works (p. 86).

I have no doubt that further research would turn up more quotes along these lines, but these are enough to provide a general idea. Reformed commentators do not seem to have any reluctance in seeing the imperfect obedience of certain OT saints as typological of the meritorious obedience of Christ. If we readily recognize the imperfect OT sacrifices as types of Christ’s passive obedience, why should there be any problem seeing the flawed obedience of certain OT saints as typological of Christ’s active obedience? I am not aware of any Reformed theologians who share the restrictive view of the authors of MM that imperfect obedience cannot typify perfect obedience. To the contrary, with just a little Internet searching (in English, not even trying Latin) it was not hard to find Reformed theologians and exegetes who took the opposite view. As Samuel Mather said, the OT saints “were not types of Christ in regard to their sinful failings, but only in their graces and excellences.”

Merit and Moses: Flawed Typology? Part 1

I am almost finished with my response to the book Merit and Moses. There is one last topic I would like to address, and that is the topic of typology. 

According to the Republication Paradigm, the Adamic covenant of works was republished in a form adapted to the post-Fall situation in the land of Canaan as a type of heaven. The obedience of certain special officers of the Mosaic theocracy under this typological works arrangement typified the active obedience of Christ that earns heaven for the elect. The authors of MM think this construction involves a “flawed and confusing typology” (MM 129). They offer three arguments.

(1) Republication teaches Israel the wrong lesson

The authors of MM write:

It is unconvincing to say that this view of “typology” would actually serve to drive the Israelites away from their own works and toward the Lord Jesus Christ. The lesson of the typological level may just as easily drive them to their own works and away from Christ (as it did in the case of the Pharisees) .... If the typological blessings are dependent on meritorious works, why shouldn’t the Israelites conclude that the reality of heaven is also obtained in the same way? (MM 129, 143).

Response: If the Israelites concluded that “heaven must be earned,” they were right to conclude that. That’s precisely the lesson God wanted them to learn! Of course, the only way heaven can be earned is not by our own righteousness but by a federal representative. Paul is quite clear that the law, with its works principle, was given as a pedagogue in order to imprison the people of God under sin until the coming of the Messiah so that we might attain righteousness, not by law-keeping, but by faith (Gal 3:22-24).

It is true, as the authors of MM recognize, the proud Pharisees erroneously thought they could keep the law and earn heaven by their own obedience. But they only thought that because they refused to heed the pedagogical lesson of the law. Those who were godly in Israel knew they could not keep the law perfectly. They learned this lesson, not by looking at the works principle in the Mosaic economy in the abstract, but in terms of the overall trajectory of Israel’s history under the law. The story of the OT is not of Israel’s success but of Israel’s repeated failure to keep the law, leading to the exile. That is why the godly in Israel were “waiting for the consolation of Israel .... and the redemption of Jerusalem” (Luke 2:25, 38).

(2) Types must typify grace

This brings us to the second argument of MM attempting to show the “flawed typology” of Klinean Republication. They claim that all OT types were a means of grace, as part of the covenant of grace, for the people of God in that time. But the works/merit principle of a covenant of works does not communicate grace.

In order for something to be a type, it must first be a symbol. That is, it must be a real means of grace for the people of God living in the time of its use .... In the nature of the case, a means of grace is governed solely by grace. How can something defined by merit in contrast to grace communicate grace to the one who performs it? (MM 130-31 n23).

In other words, all types must typify grace. Therefore, they argue, the works principle or merit cannot be typified in the OT. Indeed, this would also mean that there could not be any figures with typological merit in the OT whose obedience prefigures the meritorious obedience of Christ.

Response: This principle (that all types must typify grace and cannot typify the works principle) would rule out Adam from being a type of Christ. But Paul says Adam was a type of Christ (Rom 5:14), precisely in his capacity as a federal head under a covenant of works.

And what about the types prefiguring the day of judgment throughout the OT? For example, Noah’s flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues of Egypt, the conquest of the Canaanites, the expulsion of Israel from the land in the exile. These are not symbols of grace but of wrath.

This arbitrary principle that all types must typify grace and be a means of grace has no biblical basis as far as I can see. Biblical typology is not a monochromatic, one-dimensional vehicle for “communicating grace.” It is much more complex and variegated than that.

(3) Types may not be imperfect

Their third argument supposedly exposing the “flawed typology” of Klinean Republicationism is based on the assumption that there must be “correspondence and harmony” between the type and the antitype (MM 130). But the obedience of the OT saints was imperfect. Not only was the obedience of the OT saints imperfect, it was “inherently demeritorious ... and thus deserving of God’s judgment” (MM 87). Therefore, the flawed obedience of the OT saints cannot be typological of Christ’s perfect and meritorious obedience. The difference between the Israel’s obedience and Christ’s is “absolute,” since “the one is fatally flawed, the other is flawless” (MM 130).

Response:  If a type must be perfect in order to be a type of Christ, there could not be any types of Christ at all! The OT sacrifices were flawed and imperfect. Indeed, “it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins” (Heb 10:4). Nevertheless, despite this manifest lack of correspondence, the OT sacrifices typified Christ’s perfect atoning sacrifice. The OT priests were sinful and had to offer sacrifices for their own sins before they could offer sacrifices for the sins of the people (Heb 5:3). Nevertheless, despite this manifest lack of correspondence, the OT priests typified Christ’s priesthood. The OT kings, such as David and Solomon, were all sinners to a man and all failed in various ways to live up to the standard of the kingly office, yet no one doubts they were types of Christ in his kingly office. Nothing could be more expected and natural than that the type be imperfect. After all, the type is not the antitype; the shadow is not the reality. 

These are their three arguments attempting to show that Klinean Republication is based on “flawed typology.” But the arguments are easily answered. Two of the arguments are based on highly questionable assumptions (that types can only typify grace, and that types must not be imperfect). The authors of MM have offered no credible objection to Kline’s view that the imperfect obedience of certain OT saints was ordained by God to typify the active obedience of Christ.

Merit and Moses: The Merit of Christ, Part 9

The Singular Glory of Christ’s Meritorious Obedience 

This is their third and final argument against Klinean Republication’s view of the merit of Christ. The Republication Paradigm, they say, “serves to undermine the singular glory of Christ’s meritorious obedience” (MM 116). By defining merit in such a way that it applies equally to Adam, Israel and Christ, the Republication Paradigm “brings Christ down” to the level of Adam and Israel (MM 117) and makes these three figures (Adam, Israel, and Christ) “interchangeable,” since “each can equally perform meritorious works” (MM 117). 

By contrast, on their view, these three figures are not equally able to merit. The merit of Israel is nonexistent, the covenant merit of Adam was possible only because of God’s voluntary condescension, and only the merit of Christ is strict merit. The authors claim their understanding of merit enables them to set Christ’s meritorious obedience apart as “singular” and “unparalleled” and “unique” (MM 116-17):

Unlike Israel’s so-called “merit” (in the Republication Paradigm), Christ’s obedience is utterly flawless. Unlike Adam’s “covenant merit,” Christ’s merit requires no voluntary condescension. It is intrinsically worthy of the reward of eternal life (MM 116). 

In response, I think the authors of MM are confused in two areas.

Their first area of confusion goes back to their mistaken understanding that Kline defined merit in such a way that perfection is not required. They think Kline taught that flawed, imperfect obedience can be deemed meritorious by God on the basis of his mere will or word. But this is a misunderstanding of Kline. He never taught that, and it cannot be proved from his writings. Therefore, it is not true that the flawed, imperfect obedience of Israel is in the same category as the merit of Adam and Christ. The obedience of Israel (or of other sinful Old Testament saints, like Noah and Abraham) has merit in the typological layer only. It is not perfect and therefore not truly meritorious. There is a categorical difference between true merit and typological merit. Clearly any post-Fall individual functioning as a type of Christ, and whose imperfect obedience was invested by God with typological significance as pointing ahead to the merit of Christ, would not be interchangeable with Christ the antitype. If we are comparing the merit of Christ with that of Israel, then, we can certainly affirm the singular glory of Christ’s meritorious obedience.

But what if we are comparing the merit of Christ with that of Adam? Here, we come to their second area of confusion. Since the merit of Christ is that which God accepts in place of Adam’s, so that the elect might attain the reward of eternal life, this is a point where we should see the two as parallel, rather than trying to set apart Christ’s merit as categorically different from Adam’s. The two Adams parallel demands it. Were we to set Christ’s merit apart in a category by itself (sui generis), we would disturb the parallel between the two Adams. Christ would not be the second Adam. Both Adam and Christ were federal heads under covenants of the works variety that involved true merit based on divine justice.

Now, does this mean that there are no differences between Adam and Christ, or that the two are “interchangeable”? Of course not. We all agree that there are both similarities and differences between Christ and Adam. The similarities include:  both are fully human; both were under covenants of the works variety; both were required to obey God in order to achieve eschatological advancement; both were federal heads who represented others.

The differences include:  unlike Adam, Christ is not only human but divine; unlike Adam, Christ’s obedience included his becoming man by taking a true human nature into personal union with himself in the incarnation; unlike Adam, Christ had to obey to the point of death by offering himself as a sacrifice to satisfy God’s wrath; unlike Adam, Christ was exalted much higher than Adam would have been, by being given the divine name and being exalted to God’s right hand; unlike Adam, those whom Christ represents are his bride and he brings them into mystical union with himself.

In addition, as I argued in a previous post, the obedience of Christ has infinite glory and worth, due to the dignity of his divine person. The glory and worth of the obedience is as great as the glory and worth of the person performing the obedience. In the case of Christ, he is a divine person who assumed a human nature into personal union with himself, something that is not true of Adam. Therefore, Christ’s obedience is uniquely glorious, far more than Adam’s. In view of the divine dignity of the person of Christ, the obedience of Christ is unique, unparalleled, and awash in singular glory. Therefore, without undermining the parallelism of the merit of the two Adams, Klinean Republication can affirm the singular glory of Christ’s obedience in a variety of ways. It is simply not true that Klinean Republication makes Adam and Christ “interchangeable” (M 117).

Merit and Moses: The Merit of Christ, Part 8

The Alleged Necessity* of Christ’s Divine Nature, continued
(*for his merit)

The authors of MM claim that, in contrast with Adam’s “covenant merit,” only Christ’s merit qualifies as “strict merit.” This is because Christ’s merit is inherently infinite due to his divine nature. Here is how they put it:

For a work to be truly and properly meritorious, it must: (1) be absolutely perfect; and (2) be performed by one who is ontologically equal with God (i.e., infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being). Adam could satisfy the first condition, as he was created in original righteousness. But only Jesus Christ could satisfy the second, since he is both true man and true God, being the same in substance and equal with the Father (MM 106).

According to the authors of MM, only a divine being that is ontologically equal with God (i.e., infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being) can perform a work that is properly meritorious. By definition, the verb “to merit” is one that only God can be the subject of. Put more simply, only God can merit.

But if only God can merit, what does that say about their doctrine of God? In a proper doctrine of God, God is not a moral creature, bound under a covenant of works, and obligated to yield obedience to his own moral standard. He is the standard. He does not need to proffer obedience to his own standard, pass a probationary test, be deemed righteous, and merit a reward. To say God, as God, can obey his own standard and merit a reward from himself is to compromise the aseity and utter self-sufficiency of God. The very concept of obedience to the law and its consequent reward-ableness (i.e., merit) is applicable only to creatures made in God’s image under the law as a covenant of works. As the Westminster Confession teaches:

God hath all life, glory, goodness, blessedness, in and of himself; and is alone in and unto himself all-sufficient, not standing in need of any creatures which he hath made, nor deriving any glory from them, but only manifesting his own glory in, by, unto, and upon them. (WCF II.2)

The authors of MM have argued that meriting is something only God can do because only God is ontologically infinite. But this compromises the aseity and self-sufficiency of God. Thus, not only do the authors of MM seem to be operating with some questionable Christological assumptions, they also seem to have a defective doctrine of God.

This wraps up my response to their second argument under the topic of the merit of Christ. Their first argument was that the Republication Paradigm cannot affirm the necessity of Christ’s perfect obedience for his merit. That was based on a simple misunderstanding and so it was easily dispatched in a single post. Their second argument was that the Republication Paradigm cannot affirm the necessity of Christ’s divine nature for his merit. This was a little more challenging to respond to, and it took me seven posts to work through, beginning with this one. In my next post, I’ll turn to their third argument regarding the merit of Christ, namely, that the Republication Paradigm diminishes the singular glory of Christ’s meritorious obedience.

Merit and Moses: The Merit of Christ, Part 7

The Alleged Necessity* of Christ’s Divine Nature, continued
(*for his merit)

Christ’s satisfaction of divine justice in the law as a covenant of works involves two distinct but inseparable aspects:  bearing the curse of the law in our place (his passive obedience), and fulfilling the positive requirement of the law in our stead, thus earning for the elect a right and title to eternal life (his active obedience). Christ’s divine nature is necessary for him to satisfy the curse of the law for us but not to satisfy the positive requirement of the law in order to merit eternal life for us.

Christ’s divine nature is necessary for the first aspect, because the human nature could not have borne the wrath of God by itself. “It was requisite that the Mediator should be God, that he might sustain and keep the human nature from sinking under the infinite wrath of God” (Westminster Larger Catechism # 38). Were it not for the divine nature undergirding the human nature via the hypostatic union, the penal sufferings of Christ would have caused the human nature to sink under the infinite wrath of God. Since wrath-bearing was not part of the original mandate given to Adam under the covenant of works, it is not surprising that this would be something unique about Christ’s work. He must redeem sinners from the curse of the law, something not in view for Adam.

However, I do not see how Christ’s divine nature was necessary for the second part, the fulfilling of the positive requirement of the law. The reason, as I have argued previously, is that “Christ, the second Adam, assumes the covenant [of works] in behalf of his elect just as Adam left it” (A. A. Hodge). If the obedience demanded of Adam under the original covenant of works was human obedience, and if that human obedience, had it been rendered, would have been sufficient to earn the reward of eternal life, then the obedience Christ renders as the second Adam need not exceed Adam’s.

It is true that the person of the mediator adds to the glory, worth, and dignity of his obedience. The reason it does so, is because his obedience is the obedience, not of a mere human like Adam, but of a divine person, the Son of God. This gives his obedience greater glory, worth, and dignity. The dignity of the obedience is as great as the dignity of the person performing the obedience. Since the person is a divine person who has infinite glory, worth, and dignity, his obedience also has infinite glory, worth, and dignity, far exceeding the worth and dignity of Adam’s obedience.

But this added worth and dignity exceeds what was required of Adam. “The satisfaction of Christ was that of a divine Person, and hence was ... of infinite value ... of superabundant value” (A. A. Hodge). This superabundant worth, value and dignity, grounded in the uniqueness of Christ as a divine person, is not necessary for the satisfaction of the law’s positive requirement as the condition of eternal life. The divine person of the mediator enhances the dignity of his obedience but does not increase the merit of his obedience.

Merit does not permit of degrees. Merit simply means that the condition of the covenant of works has been fulfilled and the reward has been earned. Either one has earned the reward or one has not. Either one has merit or one does not. But one cannot have degrees of merit. Thus, while it is true that Christ’s obedience has superabounding worth and dignity far exceeding Adam’s as a mere creature, this added glory is not what enables him to fulfill the positive requirement of the covenant of works so as to earn the reward of eternal life.

Having said that, I do think it was necessary for the active obedience of Christ to be that of a divine person—just not for his merit. As we have seen, the divine person of Christ, the eternal Son of God and second person of the Trinity, had no prior obligation to perform obedience to the positive requirement of the law. When he took a human nature into personal union with himself and was “made under the law” (Gal 4:4), he did so voluntarily and therefore vicariously.

The satisfaction of Christ was that of a divine Person, and hence was superogatory [sic; should be supererogatory], not due from himself, and free to be credited to others .... Christ, although a man, was a divine person, and therefore never personally subject to the Adamic covenant of works .... He was made under the law only as our representative, and his obedience under the voluntarily assumed conditions of his earthly life was purely vicarious (A. A. Hodge).

Therefore, although the divine person of the mediator was not necessary to make his obedience meritorious, yet it was necessary to make his obedience (in its inseparable active and passive aspects) supererogatory and “for us.”

(A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology [Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1983; originally 1879], 405, 413, 415.)

Merit and Moses: The Merit of Christ, Part 6

The Alleged Necessity* of Christ’s Divine Nature, continued
(*for his merit)

I said that the authors of MM seem to assume either that the obedience of Christ was performed in his divine nature, or that his human nature was deified by virtue of union with his divine nature. I think I have shown that the first possibility—that the obedience of Christ was performed in his divine nature—is clearly unbiblical. Christ’s obedience (both active and passive) was performed in his human nature, not his divine nature. But so far I haven’t really addressed the second possibility—that his human nature was deified or somehow made ontologically infinite by virtue of the hypostatic union with his divine nature.

With regard to this second possibility, the authors of MM don’t actually do this in their book, but one imagines they could borrow a page from Lutheran theology and utilize its doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum (communication of attributes). According to the Lutheran doctrine, the hypostatic union functions as a bridge that gets the divine nature into contact with the human nature, thereby imparting divine attributes to Christ’s human nature. Specifically, the authors of MM would need this doctrine of the hypostatic union to undergird the transference of the divine attribute of ontological infinity to the human nature.

Both the Reformed and the Lutherans affirm the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, but not in the same way. For example, the Westminster Confession affirms it in these terms:

Christ, in the work of mediation, acts according to both natures, by each nature doing that which is proper to itself; yet, by reason of the unity of the person, that which is proper to one nature is sometimes in Scripture attributed to the person denominated by the other nature. (WCF VIII.7)

Reformed Christology recognizes this linguistic communicatio idiomatum as one of the ways Scripture speaks, e.g., “the church of God which He purchased with His own blood” (Acts 20:28 NASB). This statement is not a mere figure of speech. It is a true statement, grounded in the hypostatic union. “By reason of the unity of the person” it is legitimate to speak this way, because Christ is God and Christ purchased the church with his own blood, even though we must add the qualifying statement that Christ’s blood was shed in his human nature.

Lutheran Christology affirms this linguistic aspect of the communicatio idiomatum but goes further and holds that some divine attributes are actually transferred from the divine nature to the human nature in order to enable the human nature to act above its creaturely limitations. Perhaps this is just what the authors of MM need.

Remember, the authors of MM argue that the contrast between Adam’s merit and Christ’s merit is that Adam’s merit is finite and creaturely, whereas Christ’s is infinite and divine. Adam was a mere creature, and so he could only have his obedience “counted as meritorious” on the basis of God’s voluntary condescension. But “because of his divine nature, only Christ’s obedience was inherently worthy of the reward of eternal life” (MM 57). They base this reasoning on the “great ontological chasm—an ‘infinite distance’ between God and man” (MM 51). They claim that Christ’s merit, because of his deity, is “inherently worthy” (MM 57), “intrinsically infinite” (MM 57) and “inherently obligating God” (MM 58).

But there’s a problem. Even Lutheran Christology would not give them enough gas to drive their car that far. According to Lutheran dogmatician Francis Pieper, Lutheran Christology limits or qualifies the communicatio idiomatum in two ways. First, only the operative divine attributes (such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence), but not the quiescent divine attributes (like eternity, immensity, and spirituality) are communicated to the human nature. Second, the manner of communication is dynamic rather than static—the human nature receives operative divine attributes so that the divine Son can work through the human nature to perform certain divine actions, such as miracles.

Our thought-experiment of imagining how the authors of MM could utilize Lutheran Christology to get to their desired destination has failed, for even the Lutherans do not go as far as they do in ascribing “inherently infinite” ontological status to the human nature of Christ. It would seem, then, that the authors of MM would need to adopt full-blown monophysitism, the fifth-century error rejected at the Council of Chalcedon that the human nature of Christ was completely deified by the hypostatic union so that it ceased to be truly human. That might give them enough gas to get to their destination, but it comes at a hefty price—going beyond the pale of Chalcedon.

(Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics [St. Louis:  Concordia, 1951], vol. 2, pp. 236-39.)

Merit and Moses: The Merit of Christ, Part 5

The Alleged Necessity of Christ’s Divine Nature, continued

So Christ’s obedience to the law is proper to his human nature, not his divine nature. Furthermore, Christ’s obedience to the law was not an obedience that he owed to God prior to his assumption of a human nature. The Son assumed a human nature into personal union with himself precisely in order to obey the law, not for himself, but for the elect. Let’s look at some Scriptural passages that back this up.

The author of the Hebrews reads Psalm 40 as implying that Christ’s obedience to the law was voluntary and a consequence of his incarnation.

When Christ came into the world, he said, “Sacrifices and offerings you have not desired, but a body have you prepared for me .... Then I said, ‘Behold, I have come to do your will, O God, as it is written of me in the scroll of the book’” (Heb 10:5-7 ESV).

“A body have you prepared for me,” looks ahead to, “Behold, I have come to do your will, O God.” In other words, Christ became incarnate with a view to doing God’s will as written in the scroll of the book (the law).

Something similar is taught in Phil 2:5-11, whether it was composed by Paul or was a pre-Pauline creed or hymn. He says that the pre-incarnate Son existed in the form of God from eternity, but he voluntarily emptied himself by becoming a man, and it was as a man that he became obedient. 

[He] emptied himself, by taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross (Phil 2:6-8 ESV).

In a related passage dealing with the incarnation, Paul implies that Christ’s obedience was an obedience that occurred “under the law”:

When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. (Gal 4:4-5 KJV)

It was by being “sent forth” and “born of a woman” (ESV) that he was “made under the law.” He was not “under the law” from eternity. He was “made” under the law. And he was made under the law, not to obey for himself, but “to redeem them that were under the law.” John Owen made much of this passage to argue that Christ’s active obedience was imputed precisely because it was voluntary. He acknowledged that Christ’s obedience was

the obedience of the person of the Son of God, however the human nature was subject to the law .... It was not for himself, not could be for himself; because his whole person was not obliged thereunto .... It was for us, and not for himself, that he assumed our nature .... He needed no obedience for himself .... Wherefore, the Lord Christ being made under the law for us, he yielded perfect obedience unto it for us; which is therefore imputed unto us. 

Owen’s point is that the pre-incarnate Son was not under a prior obligation to yield obedience to the positive precepts of the moral law, since he was divine and “needed no obedience for himself.” However, he voluntarily assumed a human nature, and became subject to the law and its requirement of obedience. But if he was voluntarily “made under the law,” then he must have done so in order to obey in our place, so that his active obedience might be imputed to the elect. Christ’s active obedience was only required of him by virtue of his voluntarily assuming a human nature that was subject to the law.

Thus the authors of MM are incorrect when they say “the value of his merit is rooted in his divine nature.” On the contrary, it is rooted in his human nature as the second Adam. The hypostatic union brings the two natures together in an intimate union, but it does so without confusing the two natures. Each nature retains its essential properties. The union does not cause the human nature to lose its finite, creaturely status, or transform it into a divine nature. As a result, the obedience and merit of the Son in the human nature remains what it is—a fully human obedience and merit. It is not divine obedience or divine merit. Just as Jesus did not die as God but as man, so Jesus did not obey the law as God but as man. Obedience is not “proper to” the divine nature, since God is not subject to the law as if he must obey his own law in order to merit a reward from himself. The obedience of Christ is the obedience of the fully human Son of God. And it is the Son’s obedience only because the Son has assumed a full human nature into union with himself which enables him, in that human nature and as the second Adam, to obey and merit the reward.

The authors of MM seem to be operating with questionable Christological assumptions. When they claim that Christ’s merit is “intrinsically infinite in worth and value because of Christ’s divine nature” (MM 56), they seem to assume either that the obedience of Christ was performed in his divine nature, or that his human nature was deified by virtue of union with his divine nature. Either interpretation is at odds with Chalcedonian and biblical teaching.

(John Owen, The Doctrine of Justification by Faith, vol. 5 in The Works of John Owen [ed. William H. Goold; Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1990], pp. 256-58, 272-73).

Merit and Moses: The Merit of Christ, Part 4

The Alleged Necessity of Christ’s Divine Nature, continued

At this point that we need to delve into Christology—the doctrine of the two natures of Christ—in relation to the merit of Christ. I believe the authors of MM are operating with some questionable Christological assumptions. Consider what they say:

The traditional paradigm affirms that Adam’s merit was considered to be covenant merit in distinction from strict merit. In other words, Adam’s perfect obedience, as a creature, is being contrasted with Christ’s obedience as the God-man. On the one hand, Adam’s obedience was counted as meritorious on the basis of the covenant that had been established as an expression of God’s voluntary condescension .... Adam’s finite works of obedience could never be considered as valuable as the infinite gift of eternal life. On the other hand, Christ’s obedience could be counted as strictly meritorious since it was inherently worthy of receiving such a reward (MM 66).

The value of his merit is rooted in his divine nature. In other words, Christ’s merit is determined ontologically .... Christ’s merit is “strict” and “proper” merit because it does not require such condescension, as it is intrinsically infinite in worth and value because of Christ’s divine nature .... Because of his divine nature, only Christ’s obedience was inherently worthy of the reward of eternal life (MM 56-57).

According to the authors of MM, Adam’s merit was only “counted as meritorious on the basis of the covenant that had been established as an expression of God’s voluntary condescension.” It is therefore only covenant merit, not strict merit. But Christ’s merit, in contrast with Adam’s, is strictly meritorious. What is the difference between Adam and Christ? The difference is ontology: Adam’s “finite works of obedience” are performed by one who is a mere creature. Christ’s merit, however, is “intrinsically infinite in worth and value” because his works of obedience are performed by one who is divine. “Because of his divine nature, only Christ’s obedience was inherently worthy of the reward of eternal life.” Notice how they speak of Christ’s obedience as being “inherently worthy.” Adam, by contrast, being a mere creature, could only have his obedience “counted as meritorious” on the basis of the covenant, which was an expression of God’s gracious, voluntary condescension.

Notice the underlying Christological assumption behind this argument. They seem to assume one of two things: either the obedience of Christ was performed in and by the divine nature of Christ, or the human nature of Christ was given the divine property of ontological infinitude. They write: “No mere creature can perform a work by which he can inherently obligate God” (MM 58). But Christ, being very God of very God, is no mere creature; therefore, he can “obligate God” by his “inherently worthy” obedience. In order for this reasoning to work, they must assume either that the divine nature of Christ is the locus of his obedience, or that he obeyed in a deified human nature.

But such assumptions are counter-intuitive at best and unorthodox at worst. Surely, the obedience of Christ (both in its active and passive aspects) is an obedience that was performed by the Son in his human nature. Everyone believes that about his passive obedience, unless they hold to the heresy of Patripassianism. The divine nature of Christ is impassible, i.e., incapable of suffering and death. Accordingly, the church confesses that he suffered and died in his human nature. If that’s what we believe about the passive obedience, shouldn’t we say the active obedience was also performed in his human nature? After all, part of his active obedience involved resisting temptation (Matt 4:1-11; Heb 2:18; 4:15; 5:7-8). But just as God cannot die, so “God cannot be tempted with evil” (James 1:13). Therefore, the active obedience of Christ was performed in his human nature, the only nature in which he could experience temptation.

This is just good old-fashioned Chalcedonian Christology. The Council of Chalcedon, following Scripture, taught us that some activities are proper to his human nature—like being born, eating, sleeping, weeping, suffering, being tempted, and dying. Other activities are proper to his divine nature—like turning water into wine, stilling the storm, healing the sick, forgiving sins, executing judgment, and receiving worship. The famous Tome of Leo, which was read and approved at the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451), made this crystal clear. Reiterating Leo and Chalcedon, the Westminster Confession affirms that “Christ, in the work of mediation, acts according to both natures, by each nature doing that which is proper to itself” (WCF VIII.7). 

Merit and Moses: The Merit of Christ, Part 3

The Alleged Necessity of Christ’s Divine Nature, continued

Why didn’t Kline accept the ontological definition of merit, the view that strict merit requires ontological equality between the one obeying and the one obeyed, or between the value of the obedience and the value of the reward? Kline didn’t accept this use of ontology rather than covenant to measure merit because in his view it leads to a dangerous asymmetry in biblical theology. It skews the two Adams structuring of federal history. For if the merit of the second Adam is the only proper and strict merit, based on ontological equality, then the merit of the first Adam is reduced to an improper merit that is only possible because of God’s gracious, voluntary condescension.

One might object that seeing asymmetry between the two Adams can’t be totally wrong. After all, there are a number of important differences between them. The most obvious is that the first Adam was human, but the second Adam is the God-man. Paul himself spends a good portion of his famous Rom 5:12-21 passage highlighting the differences between Adam and Christ. Twice he says “the free gift is not like the trespass” (vv 15-16). And twice he uses an a fortiori argument:  if Adam’s disobedience brought death, “much more” did Christ’s obedience bring grace, righteousness, and life (vv 15, 17). Asymmetry indeed.

As true as that may be, there is one point at which asymmetry must not be introduced, namely, at the point of merit. Introducing asymmetry between the merit of the two Adams is problematic, because it undermines the concept that the salvation of the elect is founded upon the satisfaction of the justice of God. The justice of God is not bypassed but satisfied in salvation, because the merit of Christ as the second Adam is accepted by God as a substitute, on behalf of the elect, for the merit that the first Adam should have but failed to achieve. But if the merit that the first Adam should have achieved was only an improper merit based on God’s gracious voluntary condescension, then there is no necessity for the satisfaction of justice by the merit of the second Adam. There is a tension between these two things:  between ontology and satisfaction, between using ontology rather than covenant to measure strict merit, and the wonderful truth that salvation is grounded in the satisfaction of justice by a substitute (Rom 3:25-26). If we value the latter (satisfaction), we need to rethink the former (ontology).

As Kline said, “heaven must be earned” (KP 107). This is based on the Lev 18:5 principle, which may be paraphrased: “Only the doers of the law are righteous before God and will be rewarded with eternal life” (combining Rom 2:13; 7:10; 10:5). Obedience to the demands of the law (as a covenant of works) is recognized by God as righteousness, and righteousness is the necessary ground of the reward of eternal life. As applied to Adam as the federal head of the human race, the reward of eschatological advancement originally held out to Adam in the pre-Fall covenant of works was conditioned upon his obedience and righteousness. This is what God demands of all of us, either in ourselves or in our federal representative, if we would go to heaven.

But the obedience required of Adam for his eschatological advancement, and which God would have deemed as meritorious as the ground of that eschatological advancement, was not the obedience of a divine person who was ontologically equal with God. The obedience required of Adam (and of us, in Adam) is human, creaturely obedience. It is the human obedience of actively obeying the positive precepts of the moral law and passing the probation of the covenant of works. Therefore, the obedience that God accepts in place of the failure of Adam is not the obedience of Christ as divine, but the obedience of Christ as fully man, as the second Adam. In this way, the justice of God is satisfied in salvation. Heaven is earned, not by ourselves, but by Christ who earned it in our place.