The Upper Register

Romans 2:6-13: Response to Sam Waldron, Pt. 2

What was John Murray's view? In my paper I cited his commentary on Romans along with many other representatives of the traditional Reformation view that Romans 2:13 is hypothetical. Dr. Waldron takes exception to my citing Murray as a representative of this interpretation. But I remain unrepentant. The following quotes from his commentary seem to me to prove that Murray held to the hypothetical (or empty-set) view of Romans 2:13. He starts out by saying that whether there will be any doers of the law who are justified is irrelevant to Paul's purpose at this point in his argument:

"This verse [Rom 2:13]  is directly connected with the two clauses immediately preceding and supports or confirms the proposition that the law will be the instrument of the condemnation pronounced upon those who have sinned under it. The emphasis in verse 13 falls upon the difference between 'hearers of the law' and 'doers of the law'. The mere possession of the law does not insure favorable judgment on God's part. The law is the standard of judgment but it is the law as demanding conformity .... It is quite unnecessary to find in this verse any doctrine of justification by works in conflict with the teaching of this epistle in later chapters. Whether any will be actually justified by works either in this life or at the final judgment is beside the apostle's interest and design at this juncture. The burden of this verse is that not the hearers or mere possessors of the law will be justified before God but that in terms of the law the criterion is doing, not hearing. The apostle's appeal to this principle serves that purpose truly and effectively, and there is no need to import questions that are not relevant to the universe of discourse" (1.71)

At this point, Murray inserts a footnote where he quotes another commentator favorably, thus in effect adopting the empty-set view:

"Philippi's statement is worthy of quotation: 'Whether or not there are such perfect 'doers of the law' the apostle does not say in this passage, but only opposes the true standard to the false standard of the Jews, that 'hearers of the law' are just before God. The entire reasoning of the Roman epistle tends to this conclusion, that no man is by nature such a 'doer of the law,' or can be'." (1.71 n 21)

That Murray has adopted the empty-set or hypothetical view of Rom 2:13 is confirmed later on in his comments at Rom 3:20 ("by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight"):

"This [Rom 3:20] does not overthrow the principle stated in 2:13 that 'the doers of the law will be justified'. This holds true as a principle of equity but, existentially, it never comes into operation in the human race for the reason that there are no doers of the law, no doing of the law that will ground or elicit justification – 'there is none righteous, no, not one' (vs. 10)" (1.107).

Now it is true that Murray did not take Rom 2:6-11 as hypothetical (see his remarks at 1.62-63). Clearly, Murray is on Waldron's side at this point, not mine. But as Dr. Waldron himself has pointed out, some commentators adopt a mediating position in that they take Rom 2:6-11 as real but v. 13 as hypothetical. I would argue that Murray falls in this category (as did Philippi himself, whom Murray follows). I should have been clearer about this distinction, and I will make it clear in a future revision of my paper. Still, I stand by my claim that Murray interpreted Rom 2:13 hypothetically. 

Romans 2:6-13: Response to Sam Waldron, Pt. 1

Over the past three months Dr. Sam Waldron has been doing a series of blog posts titled, Is There a Future Justification by Works at the Day of Judgment? Three of his posts (# 8, 9, and 11) involved critical interaction with my paper, Romans 2:13: Is Paul Coherent? Now that he has finished his series of posts, I thought it would be good to respond "in the spirit of iron sharpening iron," as he says.

Dr. Waldron is academic dean and professor of Systematic Theology at Midwest Center for Theological Studies. I have never met him personally, but I know him as the author of a well-received exposition of the 1689 London Baptist Confession.

Let me state at the outset that the differences between us seem to be exegetical rather than theological. Although our differences have to do with the central doctrine of justification, he does not consider me to be unorthodox, nor I him. We both affirm that justification is an act of God’s free grace, wherein he pardons all our sins and accepts us as righteous in his sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us and received by faith alone (Westminster Shorter Catechism #33). I'm not aware of any differences between us on the much-debated topic of imputation.

Our differences have to do with the issue of so-called "future justification." But even here, we both affirm this concept in a very carefully prescribed manner. That is, when we use the term "justification" in reference to the future judgment, it is not being used in the technical sense of the Shorter Catechism above, but in an evidentiary sense. At the day of judgment, the evangelical obedience of believers will serve, not as the ground of their acceptance before God, but as the evidence of the genuineness of their faith. Our profession of faith will be publicly vindicated and proved right, that is, "justified," before men and angels. 

This concept of future "justification" is taught throughout the NT, as Dr. Waldron shows (Matt 7:13-24; 12:33-37; 16:27; 25:31-46; 2 Cor 5:10; Gal 6:7-8; James 2:14-26; and other passages). I'm in agreement with Dr. Waldron's interpretation of these texts. I agree with what he says about Jesus' statement that "unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven" (Matthew 5:20 ESV). Waldron writes: 

"Such a genuine heart righteousness qualitatively different than that of the Pharisees is necessary to find eschatological entrance into the kingdom of God. Of course, this is so not because it is the basis or ground of our acceptance with God. Rather it is so because it is the necessary vindication of the fact that we have saving faith and are really Christ’s disciples" (post #6).

So the difference between myself and Dr. Waldron is not whether good works are necessary as the evidence of the genuineness of our faith at the day of judgment. Our difference seems to center on the more narrow, exegetical question of whether Romans 2:6-13 (especially v. 13) can be legitimately used as a proof text for that doctrine. Dr. Waldron says Yes; I say No.

The reasons for my negative verdict I have attempted to spell out in considerable exegetical detail in my paper on Romans 2:13. But I would say that the essence of it boils down to this:  Romans 2:6-13 is part of a larger argument spanning several chapters, an argument that, at a minimum, involves Romans 1-4 as a whole. Romans 2:6-13 is not in the same category of the other NT passages cited above. This paragraph is not straightforward teaching addressed to believers as part of the exhortation to evangelical obedience. Rather, it is part of an argument leading to the conclusion that "there is none righteous," but that now there is a way for sinners to be reckoned as "righteous" in God's sight apart from law-keeping, by faith in Christ.  

Romans 2:6-13 is part of a so-called "diatribe" against the Jewish interlocutor who presumes that he will fare better than the Gentiles at the day of judgment because of his superior knowledge of God's will. Thus Paul's point is not to set forth what actually will happen at the day of judgment but to set forth the impartial principles of divine judgment, and then to show that no one, Jew or Gentile, will match up and that therefore everyone, Jew and Gentile, is equally in need of Christ’s imputed righteousness. The rhetorical situation of Romans 2:6-13 is very different from the other passages rightly cited by Waldron.

Paul's rhetorical aim in Romans 2:6-13 is to demonstrate the universal impartiality of God, that is, the notion that God judges all humanity, both those under the Law (Jews) and those outside of the Law (Gentiles), on the basis of the same standard, and that, on the basis of that impartial standard, all humanity stands without excuse and subject to God's judgment. Romans 2:6-13 is not straightforward  exhortation to Christians, like 2 Cor 5:10, but is part of an argument the conclusion of which is:

"Now we know that whatever the law says it speaks to those who are under the law, so that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may be held accountable to God. For by the works of the law no human being will be justified in his sight, since through the law comes knowledge of sin" (Romans 3:19-20 ESV).

One of the big weaknesses of any attempt, such as Dr. Waldron's, to take Rom 2:6-13 as Christian parenesis rather than as a rhetorical diatribe with unbelieving Jews about the universal impartiality of judgment is that it requires one to soften the terms that Paul uses. For example, Cranfield in his commentary writes that final acquittal is on the basis of "those works of obedience which, though but imperfect and far from deserving God’s favour, are the expression of their heart’s faith" (1.156). But as I wrote in my paper:

"It is understandable that those who wish to interpret Rom 2:13 in a real sense would want to avoid the implication that perfect obedience is required for final justification. No one claims that perfection is possible.  But where in the context does this idea of imperfect obedience come from? It has to be smuggled in to avoid a theologically unacceptable idea of salvation by perfect obedience. But this is to do eisegesis rather than exegesis." (pp. 54-55)

So Dr. Waldron and I disagree on Romans 2:6-13, but in the overall scheme of things, those differences are small and exegetically focused. Theologically, we are in agreement. We hold the same Reformed doctrine of justification. We also agree that there will be a future judgment in which the evangelical obedience of believers will be brought forward to vindicate the genuineness of their faith before a watching universe. Dr. Waldron misrepresents me when he writes:  "Though Irons' concern for the maintenance of free justification is laudable, yet his denial of a future justification according to works represents a significant over-simplification" (post #2). Perhaps he did not read my paper all the way through, since I have a section at the end where I spend four pages affirming judgment according to works (pp. 58-61), even favorably quoting Murray himself when he wrote that "good works as the evidence of faith ... are therefore the criteria of judgment" (1.79).